Hub Intel Log // 005
Published: Jan 23, 2026

Sinobi Group

Introduction

Sinobi emerged in late June 2025. This ransomware group employs a combination of AES and RSA encryption algorithms to lock victims’ files, appending them with the .SINOBI extension. Upon infection, victims receive a ransom note titled README.txt, instructing them to contact the attackers via a Tor-based chat site to negotiate payment. The note emphasizes that the group is financially motivated, not politically, and offers proof of data decryption and a list of exfiltrated files. Victims are given seven days to initiate communication, with warnings against using third-party recovery tools or rebooting their systems

Summary

Sinobi initiates its attacks through various entry points, including initial access brokers, phishing kits, and exploiting vulnerabilities in remote access systems like Citrix or Fortinet. They may also utilize supply chain compromises to infiltrate target organizations through trusted third parties. The group’s operational patterns closely mirror established threats like RansomHub and ALPHV, drawing inspiration from leaked Conti ransomware methods. Once inside, operators conduct "hands-on-keyboard" intrusions using a mix of custom tools and living-off-the-land techniques. Attackers prioritize privilege escalation and security evasion by creating admin accounts and disabling endpoint protections. Persistence is typically established by configuring legitimate remote access tools to maintain a foothold. A lightweight reconnaissance script is then deployed to automate lateral movement and identify critical domain information and file shares. Before encryption begins, data is exfiltrated to offsite cloud storage using tools like Rclone or WinSCP. The ransomware binary, often disguised with a generic filename, deletes the Recycle Bin and encrypts files with a .SINOBI extension. Finally, ransom notes are dropped in every directory, and the desktop wallpaper is replaced with a demand for payment.

Sinobi Group (Quick cover)

Common Use Cases
  • Ransomeware as a service
  • Potential rebrand of Lynx malware group
  • VPN or RDP protocols
Recent Victims
  • Manufactoring indistry
  • Healthcare
  • Education

Background and History

Sinobi can be traced back to several group0s in 2022, traces technical lineage link to INC Ransomware from August 2023, whose source code was sold for $300,000 on underground forums in spring 2024. It was then acquired and bought by the Lynx operators in July 2024. Binary analysis reveals 70% function similarity between Lynx and INC implementations, with code overlaps, and desgin choices. Other infomration such as the design of their leak sites suggests that multuple rebrandings have taken place, though both groups currently operate in parallel. The operation is therefore thought to follow standard affiliate revenue share models, with selective vetting through Russian-language forums.

INC activity diminished and a new group called Lynx emerged around the same time. There is no confirmation that Lynx operators purchased INC source code, but Lynx is clearly a successor to INC. Lynx was an active and aggressive threat for about one year, and then scaled back its activities in mid-2025. The group remains a threat, but its activity declined around the time Sinobi emerged in June 2025. Sinobi is widely believed to be a rebrand, successor, or offshoot of Lynx ransomware.

TTPs and Attack Methodology

Sinobi gains initial access primarily by abusing valid credentials, usually VPN or RDP logins purchased from initial access brokers or harvested via prior compromise. Sinobi also conducts phishing campaigns to steal credentials or deploy malware and actively exploits vulnerabilities in internet-facing infrastructure, including SonicWall SSL-VPN appliances and other unpatched perimeter devices. In some cases, Sinobi leverages trusted third-party or MSP access to pivot into victim environments.

Sinobi escalates privileges shortly after initial access by abusing built-in Windows administrative capabilities. Sinobi frequently creates new local administrator accounts or elevates existing accounts to ensure unrestricted control over compromised systems.

MITRE Tactic Technique ID Technique & Technical Details
Initial Access T1133 / T1190 Exploitation of CVE-2024-53704 (SonicWall SSL VPN) and targeting public-facing management platforms. Use of compromised MSP accounts.
Persistence T1219 / T1136 Installation of AnyDesk for backdoor access and creation of new local administrator accounts.
Defense Evasion T1562.001 Disabling endpoint security tools (EDR) and adjusting firewall permissions; use of obfuscated binaries like "bin.exe".
Discovery T1087 / T1135 Deployment of lightweight reconnaissance scripts to enumerate domain info, file shares, and identify privileged accounts.
Lateral Movement T1021.001 Hands-on-keyboard movement using RDP and abused living-off-the-land (LotL) binaries.
Exfiltration T1567.002 Staging and moving data to cloud storage using Rclone or WinSCP prior to encryption.
Impact T1486 / T1491 File encryption with .SINOBI extension, deletion of Recycle Bin, and desktop wallpaper defacement.

Hashes and IOCs

SHA256: 1b2a1e41a7f65b8d9008aa631f113cef36577e912c13f223ba8834bbefa4bd14 (primary payload)

SHA1: 3ebf5f01ac8ca704f4ab9e12acd11139f3ff838f

SHA1: 2101541061fb52b178165e7ef22244ec42601aea

SHA1: 3055b209cfdd3bd297029ef4270b77b50f76dc03

SHA1: 86233a285363c2a6863bf642deab7e20f062b8eb

References

Halycon, "Sinobi Threat Group", Online, [Available] https://www.halcyon.ai/threat-group/sinobi

VECTRA, "Sinobi", Online, [Available] https://www.vectra.ai/modern-attack/threat-actors/sinobi

CYfirm, "Weekly Intelligence Report July 2025", Online, [Available] https://www.cyfirma.com/news/weekly-intelligence-report-11-july-2025/

Barracuda, "Sinobi, The Bougie Exclusive Ransomeware Group thjat wants to rule", Online, [Available] https://blog.barracuda.com/2025/11/17/sinobi--the-bougie-exclusive-ransomware-group-that-wants-to-be-a

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